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Abstract:  Because they are now members of most Western European parliaments, Populist Radical 
Right Parties (PRRPs) have the potential to influence the formulation of socio-economic policies. 
However, scholarly attention so far has nearly exclusively focused on the impact of PRRPs on what is 
considered their ‘core issue’, i.e. migration policy. In this paper, we provide the first mixed methods 
comparative study of the impact of PRRPs on redistributive and (de-) regulative economic policies. 
Combining quantitative data with qualitative case studies, our results show that the participation of 
PRRPs in right-wing governments has noteworthy implications for socio-economic policies. Due to 
the heterogeneous constituencies of PRRPs, these parties not only refrain from welfare state 
retrenchment but are also less inclined to engage in deregulation compared with right-wing 




Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) have successfully evolved from “pariahs to power” (De 
Lange 2008). At first ostracised by other parties, they are now represented in the parliaments of 
most Western European countries, have taken part in government in a number of them, and 
therefore influence policymaking. Accordingly, scholarly attention has slowly started to move its 
focus from explaining their electoral fortunes to analysing their impact on public policies 
(Akkerman and De Lange 2012; De Lange 2012).  
With a few exceptions (e.g. Verbeek and Zaslove 2015), however, previous studies have so 
far mostly focused on the impact of PRRPs on policies within their ‘core domains’, such as 
migration and integration policy (e.g. Akkerman 2012). However, achieving parliamentary or 
executive representation also gives PRRPs potential influence in other core areas of state 
intervention, including economic and social policies. This article offers the first systematic 
comparative study of their impact on both redistributive (i.e. social spending and welfare 
generosity) and regulative (i.e. market-making) economic policies in Western Europe. 	
In order to analyse the impact of PRRPs on socio-economic policies, we combine 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Lieberman 2005). We first address the impact of the 
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parliamentary representation of PRRPs and their government participation on socio-economic 
policy formulation between 1970 and 2010 in 17 West European countries. Using a matching tool 
for case selection, we complement our statistical analysis with a case study of PRRP government 
participation in Austria in the 1990s and 2000s in order to gather insights into the policymaking 
processes at work. 	
 
Populist Radical Right Parties and Socio-Economic Policy 
The last three decades have witnessed the strengthening and “mainstreaming” of PRRPs within 
West European party systems (Mudde 2007). While the electoral fortunes of parties within this 
family vary greatly, many have managed to establish themselves as relevant actors in government 
coalitions in countries such as Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway and Italy. As their 
electoral success hinged on stricter immigration controls, tougher law and order policies, and 
restrictive welfare provision for immigrants in particular (Betz and Johnson 2004; Mudde 2007; 
Van der Brug and Fennema 2003), it has naturally raised the question of their impact on policy 
formulation (see Mudde 2013 for a recent review). 	
Previous studies have understandably focused on the impact of PRRPs on the policy 
domains that they are considered to “own”, such as immigration, integration and law and order 
(Akkerman 2012; Bale 2008; Minkenberg 2001; Mudde 2013; Zaslove 2004). Indeed, research has 
shown that these parties mobilize voters primarily along the value/identity dimension and not so 
much on the socio-economic dimension of electoral politics (Arzheimer and Carter 2003; Gabel 
and Huber 2000; Kriesi et al. 2006; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). However, this does not 
mean that they cannot affect socio-economic policies, especially as coalition politics involves 
complex negotiations about different policy issues with other parties. Yet, no systematic large-N 
analysis has been conducted on the socio-economic policy impact of PRRPs and the number of 
qualitative case studies explicitly addressing this question is limited (see, however, Afonso 2015). 
This is somewhat surprising because the role and preferences of PRRPs in the socio-economic 
domain have been the subjects of sharp controversies, depending on the alleged preferences of their 
voters (vote-seeking strategies) and the autonomy of PRRP party elites towards them when it 
comes to coalition formation (office-seeking strategies).	
 
Vote-seeking strategies 
The first comparative studies in the field already pointed out that the Radical Right was not only 
interested in culturally-related issues, but also in socio-economic questions as a result of the 
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realignment of the economic preferences of working-class voters towards pro-market agendas. One 
of the most prominent advocates of this view was Kitschelt (1995), who argued that the electoral 
success of PRRPs hinged on a combination of nationalism and neoliberalism (see also Betz 1994). 
According to Kitschelt, PRRPs were indeed radical with regard to their culturally authoritarian 
stance, but also in their demand for laissez-faire policies aiming at less redistribution, lower 
taxation and reduced welfare expenditures. They supported the deregulation of state monopolies 
and the dismantlement of neo-corporatist arrangements perceived to benefit the political 
establishment. Following this view, we would then expect PRRPs to support measures of 
liberalization once in government. 
In recent studies, the market-liberal character of PRRPs has been questioned, especially by 
those interested in the political attitudes of PRRP voters. These studies convincingly show that 
PRRP supporters share similar concerns about cultural identity and especially immigration control 
(Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Van der Brug and Fennema 2007; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 
2009) but are profoundly divided in their socio-economic preferences. This divide exists in 
particular between their two traditional core clienteles, the anti-state petite bourgeoisie on the one 
hand and the traditionally left-leaning working class on the other (Ignazi 2003; Ivarsflaten 2005; 
Mudde 2007; Afonso 2015). In the face of these divisions, PRRPs are believed to follow strategies 
of “position blurring”, either presenting “vague or contradictory positions” (Rovny 2013, 6) or 
downplaying  their socio-economic program (Cole 2005; Afonso 2015), which some authors see as 
essentially subordinate to their nationalist ideology (Mudde 2007, 119). However, such electoral 
strategies are of limited value once PRWPs are in office because their position on these matters 
becomes much more difficult to obscure, when laws have to be voted and budgets allocated. Then, 
strategies of position blurring might translate into inconsistent socio-economic policy reforms, e.g. 
by mixing up general liberalization with “specific (often purely symbolic) protectionist measures 
and new programmes for selected groups (small business owners, families with children and so on) 
deemed vital to the political success of the government” (Heinisch 2003, 103).	
Finally, different expectations of the policy impact of PRRPs appear in several studies 
where PRRPs are presented as new working class parties (Arzheimer 2012; Ignazi 2003). These 
studies either show that working-class voters are already the most important group in PRRPs or 
claim that working-class support for the Radical Right is steadily increasing (Betz 2002; 
blindedAfonso 2015). The common inference from these electoral changes is that PRRPs have 
abandoned their former market-liberal positions in favour of more centrist agendas, in line with the 
preferences of their now more left-leaning supporters (Aichholzer et al. 2014; De Lange 2007; 
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Kitschelt 2004; Kitschelt 2007; McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Schumacher and Kersbergen 2014; 
Van Spanje and Van der Brug 2007). This re-orientation of PRRPs should express itself especially 
with regard to redistributive social policies as the working-class still has a strong interest in the 
preservation of traditional social insurance schemes (Häusermann, Picot and Geering 2013, 
229;Afonso 2015).	
Summarizing the arguments on the policy preferences of PRRPs derived from their 
electoral constituencies, the theoretical expectations are mixed. On the one hand, even the initial 
advocates of the “winning formula” (Kitschelt 2004; Kitschelt 2007; McGann and Kitschelt 2005) 
acknowledge that the socio-economic profile of PRRP voters today is much more left-leaning than 
in the early 1990s. On the other hand, PRRPs do not seem to follow a clear socio-economic agenda 
and the salience of these issues in their programmes remains low. Their policy stance is therefore 
unclear both during electoral campaigns, when they try to diffuse their positions, and in 
government, when they seem to advocate somewhat inconsistent political platforms.  
 
Office-seeking strategies 
So far, we have derived our arguments on the policy impact of PRRPs from the socio-economic 
profile of their voters. However, as far as Western Europe is concerned, PRRPs have been able to 
enter national government coalitions only with other right-wing (Conservative, Christian-
democratic or Liberal) political parties generally holding market-liberal views on the economy.1 
The participation of these parties in government is hence embedded in intricate processes of 
coalition formation and log-rolling with centre-right parties. According to De Lange (2012, 907), 
right-wing coalitions are an attractive option for mainstream right parties because PRRPs enable 
them to form politically viable and ideologically cohesive coalitions. As far as the mainstream right 
is concerned, political deals with PRRPs can draw on giving them concessions in the domain of 
immigration control (which PRRPs “own” and on which mainstream right parties have converged 
anyway) in exchange for their support for liberalizing socio-economic reforms (which are more 
important for mainstream right parties than for PRRPs). This kind of political deal, however, may 
be dangerous for PRRPs if one considers their strong working-class base. Indeed, cutting welfare 
																																								 																				
1 One exception is the Syriza-Independent Greeks coalition formed in Greece in 2015, and Swiss 
governmnets where the radical right shares office with all major parties. The radical right has also held office 
with left-wing parties at the sub-national level in a number of countries. 
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programmes on which many of their voters rely can translate into severe electoral losses. How can 
this trade-off be resolved? 
 We argue that this is possible only by differentiating socio-economic policies between 
those concerning redistribution (welfare state retrenchment being the most prominent among these) 
and those concerning the deregulation of former regulated markets, including financial 
liberalization, privatization of former state-owned companies, and the labour market (see Aranson 
and Ordeshook 1981; Lowi 1972). While their mainstream right coalition partners generally have a 
strong interest in both kinds of liberalization (see Bale 2003; Giger and Nelson 2011), we argue 
that PRRPs might have incentives to support (or consent to) deregulation but are more hesitant to 
support policies of welfare retrenchment once in government.  
Starting with redistribution, supporting welfare retrenchment might be a serious problem 
for PRRPs because at least part of their electoral base has a strong interest in traditional social 
insurance programs, such as pensions (Häusermann, Picot and Geering 2013, 229;Afonso 2015). 
Welfare reforms can be expected to be salient issues, and strategies of position blurring which can 
be successful during electoral campaigns – are very difficult to carry out when in government. 
Thus, PRRPs face a potential trade-off between office and votes when it comes to redistribution 
(blinded for review): supporting the policies of their liberal and conservative coalition partners may 
harm their own working-class electorate, while defending the interests of their own electorate may 
jeopardize alliances with their mainstream-right partners. If PRRPs focus on votes, they should be 
more likely to defend the status quo when it comes to redistribution.  
 
H1: Centre-right governments with PRRP participation will pursue more redistributive economic 
policies compared with centre-right governments without PRRP participation.  
 
As far as deregulation is concerned, we argue that the picture is different than this for redistributive 
issues, and that this domain is less problematic in terms of coalition bargaining and electoral 
effects. We see three main reasons for this. The most straightforward can be found in the interests 
of their potential mainstream right coalition partners. If PRRPs demand tougher immigration 
legislation but do not consent to welfare retrenchment, deregulation in other less salient domains 
becomes the only concession which can be offered.  
Beside this coalition-based logic, PRRPs themselves might have a direct interest in 
deregulation given their general hostility to organized interests, especially to trade unions. This 
widespread critique of neo-corporatism among PRRPs is rooted in their anti-elite ideology (see 
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Heinisch 2003; Mudde 2007). PRRPs as “outsider” political actors may also favour deregulation 
because they have not been part of the state-market networks (including connections between 
parties, trade unions and employers) that have governed many European market economies. 
Therefore, policies that might break up these corporatist networks and undermine the power of 
interest groups and established parties can be expected to find PRRP support. Trade unions in 
particular are among the most purposeful defenders of regulation (Davidsson and Emmenegger 
2013) because both labour market deregulation and privatization of formerly state-owned 
enterprises directly concern their own power base (Obinger, Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer 2014). Hence, 
the deregulation of these domains should be in the direct interest of both PRRPs as well as pro-
business mainstream right parties. 	 
Finally, PRRPs might prefer deregulation to retrenchment because it is surely less salient in 
the eyes of their voters. Deregulation often appears rather technical and usually demands a higher 
degree of information to assess its outcomes, making such policies less conflictual in electoral 
terms than policies with clearer distributional effects. Therefore, support for deregulation might be 
more compatible with PRRPs’ electoral strategy of “position blurring”. Taking the three arguments 
together, we expect PRRPs in government to support policies of deregulation, or at least to consent 
to such reforms introduced by their centre-right coalition partners 
 
H2: Governments with PRRP participation will support deregulatory economic policies. This 
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Finally, the potential policy impact of PRRPs does not only hinge on their conflict between vote- or 
office-seeking strategies but also on the opportunity structures they face once in government. This 
involves for instance cabinet duration and the size of cabinet majorities. While the lack of adequate 
majorities and of sufficient time for the implementation of reforms are restrictions for any kind of 
government – be it with or without PRRP participation – for the analysis of PRRPs this argument is 
arguably even more important. Empirically, governments with PRRP participation tend to be less 
stable, and are significantly shorter than other governments. They might therefore simply lack the 
time to implement either redistributive or deregulatory reforms. To account for this, we will 
compare their policy impact depending on government duration and expect for both H1 and H2 that 
PRRP governments will have the most pronounced impact in the long run.      
 
Research Design, Method and Data 
To investigate our hypotheses, we combine a statistical analysis with case study evidence. We first 
conduct a large-N quantitative analysis investigating the average effect of PRRP government 
participation on redistributive and regulative economic policies. In a second step, we quantitatively 
compare the impact of governments with PRRP support with comparable market liberal 
governments depending on how much time the respective governments had to implement 
redistributive and deregulative reforms. Thirdly, we select two cases (one with and one without a 
PRRP in cabinet), based on the distribution of the statistically most important variables. This 
within-case comparison provides us with evidence to establish the inference from the statistical 
analysis and weakens the power of alternative explanations.  
We start by calculating several time-series cross-sectional regression models. In the first 
series, we analyse PRRPs’ impact on welfare generosity2. In the second part, we estimate their 
impact on deregulative economic policies. All models are based on data for 17 Western European 
countries3 for the period 1970-2010 (see Table 1). The sample selection is intended to cover the 
																																								 																				
2	In addition, we also report models with welfare spending as the dependent variable in the Online Appendix 
of this paper (see Table C). In essence, these models show very comparable effects on the impact of PRRPs 
on welfare generosity.	
3 These are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.  
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whole range of countries within Western Europe for the entire period since the rise of the first 
PRRPs.4 	
Regarding our methodology for the quantitative part, there are often considerable doubts 
about the robustness of average effects in social science studies using macro variables (e.g. Kittel 
2006). This is because the regression results are very sensitive to the specification choices made 
and the inclusion and exclusion of specific cases (Imbens 2015). This problem is particularly 
salient in our case as well. Technically speaking, the characteristics of governments where PRRPs 
participate are far from balanced compared with those without it: PRRP governments are not only 
significantly more market-liberal but also tend to govern in wealthier countries which are already 
more liberalized, have weaker labour unions and considerably higher public debts and lower levels 
of unemployment.5  
In order to deal with this, we use entropy balancing as an established and non-parametric 
way to obtain regression weights (Hainmueller and Xu 2011). This procedure assigns higher 
weights to observations of governments without PRRP membership that are more similar to 
governments with PRRPs. Put more simply, more market-liberal governments in wealthier 
countries with low union density and higher degrees of globalization compare closely with our 
governments of interest and are consequently given higher regression weights. Theoretically, these 
adjustments should make the estimators less dependent on specification choices, a proposition we 
tested with several robustness checks.6 In all models, we apply panel corrected standard errors to 
avoid overconfidence (Beck and Katz 1995). 
 
Dependent Variables 
Building on the tradition of two independent dimensions of socio-economic policies – the 
redistribution via production of public goods and the regulation of market externalities (Aranson 
and Ordeshook 1981; Lowi 1972) – we differentiate between PRRPs’ impact on redistributive and 
regulative economic policies.  
To capture the redistributive dimension of economic policies, we use changes in welfare 
generosity (Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto 2014) as our dependent variable. Welfare generosity consists 
																																								 																				
4 We also run all models on restricted samples focusing (1) only on the period from 1990 to 2010 and (2) only 
on countries with PRRPs in parliament from 1970 to 2010. The findings of the subsample regressions very 
much resemble the findings of the regressions based on the entire sample of countries from 1970 to 2010. The 
additional models are reported in the Online Appendix (Figure C and D).  
5 See Table B in the Online Appendix for an overview of the distributions. 
6 See Figure E in the Online Appendix.  
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of the average entitlements to pensions, unemployment and sick leave, which are calculated as the 
replacement rate of the (gross) average production worker wage. Welfare generosity takes into 
account both benefits as well as entitlement duration and qualification (see Scruggs 2014 for 
detailed description) and is therefore more closely linked to the influence from political decisions 
than, say, social spending as a share of GDP. 
In contrast to measurements of welfare efforts, the regulative dimension of economic 
policies is more challenging to measure. For our measure, we consider three policy fields: labour 
market regulation, the privatization of infrastructure, and the regulation of financial markets.7 
Labour market regulation measures the strictness of employment protection for permanent and 
fixed-term contracts. It consists of eight indicators (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD] 2013). The privatization of infrastructure consists of seven indicators 
tapping into the regulation in energy, transport and communications (OECD 2011). The regulation 
of financial markets is captured by the index developed by Abiad and Mody (2005) covering six 
policy fields. The presence of an underlying regulative dimension was tested via principal 
component analysis and confirmed with structural equation modelling. Both procedures helped 
establish that the three policy areas belong to an overall regulative policy dimension.8 The latent 
construct obtained from the structural equation model will serve as our indicator of regulative 
economic policy.  
For both welfare generosity and deregulation, cabinets (rather than country-years) are the 
more suitable temporal and substantial units of analysis because the preferences of political parties 
are expected to gain effectiveness within governmental periods (see Schmitt 2015). Hence, we use 
cabinets as our unit of analysis. 
 
Main Independent Variables: PRRPs in Government 
PRRPs are expected to influence policymaking via their participation in government. Table 1 lists 
the parties we regard as being PRRPs and the years and cabinets in which they have achieved 
formal or informal government participation. We define parties as being formal coalition partners 
when they are represented in the executive decision-making body, the cabinet, and support their 
																																								 																				
7 While the inclusion of additional policy fields would surely be plausible, our selection is motivated by the 
overall importance of these three areas for national political economies as well as by the availability of 
quantitative data. 
8	The latent variable model show an almost perfect model fit (X²=0.00***; CFI 1.0). The specific results are 
reported in the Online Appendix (Table A). See Figure A in the Online Appendix for the temporal 
development of the individual indicators. 
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coalition partner(s) in the legislative arena. In contrast, informal coalition partners are not 
represented in the executive but lend support to the coalition in the legislative arena in various 
forms, ranging from support for single but crucial legislative packages (e.g. adoption of the yearly 
budget) to systematic legislative support via sanctioned coalition-agreements (see: Bale and 
Bergman 2006). With regard to our cases, all informal PRRP governments took the form of 
minority governments in which the legislative support of PRRPs was crucial for the governments’ 
ability to pass legislation. Because of this, we see PRRPs in both formal and informal governments 
as being accountable in the eyes of their voters. In order to classify parties as being PRRPs, we 
follow the definition of Mudde (2007) and see nationalism as their core ideological feature, leading 
to the list of parties presented in Table 1. However, a very similar list of PRRPs might be obtained 
by using alternative definitions (e.g. Carter 2005; Ignazi 2003; Norris 2005). In total, the list of 
cabinets with PRRP support includes 20 cases.9  
 
 




Alternative Explanations and Controls	
In order to assess the impact of PRRPs on socio-economic policies, we need to make sure that 
differences are not due to ideological differences in their (right-wing) coalition partners. We start 
from the idea that these differences cannot be fully captured by party families alone. In order to 
analyse the potential impact of PRRPs, we therefore need measures of government positions on 
redistributive and regulative economic policies beyond mere party lines. To calculate these 
positions of each single party (including PRRPs) we use the Comparative Manifesto Project data 
(CMP) and follow the approach ofRöth 2016 by selecting socio-economic policy issues which can 
be definitely attributed either to more market-liberal or state interventionist policies.10 We then 
																																								 																				
9 However, the Schüssel II government will be analysed in combination with the Schüssel I cabinet. We 
proceed this way because it lasted only one month in 2002 and two in 2003. Therefore, we remain with 19 
cases for the statistical analysis.  
10 The aggregated measure of market liberalism vs. state interventionism entails the following categories: Free 
enterprise (401), Incentives (402), Administrative efficiency (303), Economic orthodoxy (414), Regulation 
(403), Demand management (409), Economic planning (404), Controlled economy (412), Nationalization 
(413), Marxist analysis (415), Less spending on welfare (505), Less spending on education (507), Welfare 
state expansion (504), Social justice (503), Environmental protection (501), Anti-Growth (416). The issues 
 
Forthcoming in European Political Science Review 
11	
	
calculate government positions by weighting each government party’s position by its relative 
cabinet seat share to account for the variety of positions in coalition governments (see Döring and 
Manow 2012). The resulting variable market liberalism of government has been standardized and 
ranges from 0 (most interventionist) to 1 (most market-liberal). Please note that the CMP data does 
not allow us to separate between redistributive and deregulative economic issues. Thus, and if our 
assumptions on the different interest of PRRPs in these two policy dimensions are correct, the 
overall economic positions of PRRPs might appear more centrist than they deserve. While the main 
objective of the market-liberalism variable is to control for the ideology of PRRPs’ coalition 
partners, this leaves the programmatic effect of PRRPs to be explained mainly by the dummy 
accounting for their government participation.         
The ability of governments to implement reforms in line with their preferences depends on 
several factors. We consider that the most important of these are adequate majorities with sufficient 
time for the implementation of reforms. We control time through the duration of the cabinet in 
months and majorities with the relative cabinet share of seats in parliament. 
Globalization and Europeanization are seen to be main drivers of welfare state 
retrenchment and especially of economic deregulation. We control for globalization with the 
proportion of exports and imports to overall GDP. The influence of Europeanization is tested by an 
index of European Monetary Union (EMU) integration, summing up the membership levels of the 
three implementation stages. EMU can be seen as the most powerful instrument for restricting the 
fiscal and monetary autonomy of the member states, thereby curbing tendencies towards 
interventionist economic policies (Höpner and Schäfer 2012).	
Besides Globalization and Europeanization, the so-called post-industrial context is seen as 
having an impact on distributive and regulative economic policies. We capture the conflicting 
assumptions related to the post-industrialization arguments (Iversen and Cusack 2000) with a 
control consisting of the percentage of the working-age population active in the service sector. We 
also include union density as a control because organized labour might be a relevant opponent of 
both less redistributive and more market-liberal reforms.	
Short- and long-term economic and demographic developments are major drivers of 
welfare generosity. Unemployment is an important influence on this and varies significantly in the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																								
are combined via a latent mixed item response model, using market liberalism as a latent construct and the 
empirical Bayesian means for the positional predictions (for a detailed discussion of the measure see:Röth 
2016). 
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short-run. Consequently, the lagged level and changes in unemployment are controlled for in the 
models. The overall affluence of a society is controlled by the Chain index – the natural logarithm 
of real GDP per capita. In addition, we include the growth rate of GDP in order to capture 
economic cycles. We control for public debt by the lagged level and the change rate, as public 
obligations should restrict redistributive generosity and might make deregulatory policy reforms 
more necessary. The base and change rate of people entitled to pensions is controlled by the 
proportion of people older than 65 as a percentage of the population; child-related welfare demand 
is captured by the proportion of people younger than 15. Migration is seen as an intervening force 
in social spending, even though expectations in this regard are ambiguous (Soroka et al. 2015). We 
control for its impact by including the net migration rate in our models. Finally, each model 
includes lagged level dependent variables to capture the declining likelihood of further 
redistributive or deregulatory reforms in countries that are already liberalized to a high degree.	
 
Quantitative Analysis: Average Effects of PRRP Government Participation 
We present the results of the balanced time-series cross-sectional regression models in Table 2. 
Overall, we estimate four models, two with welfare generosity and two with deregulation as the 
dependent variable. The central independent variables are PRRP government participation, the 
market liberalism of the respective government, and the government duration. Interpreting the 
effect of the PRRP dummy, note that it shows the difference of having a PRRP in government 
compared with market-liberal governments without PRRP participation. The PRRP dummy thus 
represents the distinct combination of redistributive and deregulative issues in the Radical Right’s 
manifestos, as well as the distinct situation these parties are confronted with in terms of logrolling 
with their mainstream-right coalition partners. In models 2 and 4, we further analyse this average 
effect by interacting it with government duration. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Starting with model 1, we compare the average impact of PRRPs on welfare generosity with other 
market-liberal governments – of which PRRP governments are a sub-category of. While the degree 
of market liberalism has a substantial and negative effect on welfare generosity (-2.29***), the 
average effect of PRRPs is positive (+0.59***). Therefore, whereas more market liberal 
government without PRRP inclusion systematically reduce the generosity of the welfare state, 
PRRPs curb these retrenchment efforts significantly while being members of centre-right 
 
Forthcoming in European Political Science Review 
13	
	
coalitions. The balanced model shows very plausible effects on several other variables and explains 
a remarkable part of the variance for a first difference model (R²=0.29).  
The difference between market liberal governments with and without PRRP support should 
increase with the time a government has to implement its preferred policies. This is exactly what 
we find in model 2, integrating the interaction between market liberalism and government duration. 
For the ease of interpretation, we graphically present the interaction effect in Figure 1, separating 
government duration into three categories (short if the government lasted less than 12 months; 
medium if between 12 and 36 months; long if for more than 36 months). In the short-run, PRRPs do 
not significantly matter for the generosity of benefits. However, with increasing time the 
differences play out very clearly. Whereas market-liberal governments pursue welfare 
retrenchment, governments with PRRP support defend the status quo or even slightly increase the 
generosity of the welfare state. The models 1 and 2 therefore give support for H1.   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Coming to the regulatory dimension of economic policies, model 3 shows that market liberal 
governments substantially and significantly deregulate the economy (+11.82***). While the effect 
of PRRP cabinet participation on deregulation is also positive, it turns out insignificant (+0.65; 
model 4). Therefore, market liberal governments with PRRP participation are not less inclined to 
deregulation than market liberal governments in general; a finding giving support for H2. However, 
turning to the interaction of time and ideology in Figure 2, we see that this general statement on the 
limited impact of PRRPs on deregulation is mainly due to the shorter government duration of 
PRRP cabinets. While market liberal governments without PRRPs are strong drivers of 
deregulation once they have sufficient time to shape their preferred policies, the impact of market 
liberal governments with PRRPs is slightly positive and turns to zero for long-term governments. 
Disaggregating the effect of PRRPs on the three sub-dimensions of deregulation, we observe that 
PRRPs seem more open to labour market deregulation and privatization than to financial market 
deregulation (see Online Appendix, Figure E). As the former forms of deregulation directly or 
indirectly affect the power of organized labour, these findings are in line with our theoretical 
expectations. However, for all three sub dimensions we find that centre-right governments with 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
 
In sum, the quantitative analysis shows that governments with PRRP have a different impact on 
redistributive and regulatory economic policies than centre-right governments without PRRP 
support. Regarding the former, their impact on welfare generosity is in line with vote-seeking 
explanations. PRRPs tend to block the retrenchment agenda of their mainstream right coalition 
partners. Regarding deregulation, the effect of PRRPs in government is overall supportive and 
crucially hinges on the opportunity structure of governments. PRRPs seem to hesitantly support the 
deregulation agenda of their market liberal allies, especially so in the areas of labour market and 
privatization of former state owned companies. However, market liberal governments without 
PRRPs deregulate these policy areas far more.  
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Selections for case study analysis 
The quantitative models provide evidence on the average relationship of PRRP as government 
members and the resultant change in redistributive and regulative policies. The main aim of the 
following qualitative case studies is to trace how PRRPs shape formulation and implementation 
in redistributive and regulative policies. There are arguably multiple ways to select cases for 
intensive analysis drawing on quantitative analysis (Lieberman 2005; Weller and Barnes 2014). 
We follow the rationale of Weller and Barnes (2014) in proposing to use quantitative 
information for the selection of pathway cases: cases which have a high likelihood of allowing 
the observability of the mechanism (Gerring, 2007).which is theoretically expected, and whose 
presence is assumed by quantitative models at another level of causality. 
The basic idea is not to rely on the predictive fit of a case in a quantitative model alone 
(as e.g. Lieberman 2005 suggests), because a good prediction can be caused by many other 
variables beside the main one of interest (Rohlfing 2008). Therefore, we select a case with good 
prediction and choose a second case for comparison with very similar attributes on all the 
important control variables. Thereby, we raise the likelihood that the observed mechanism is 
due to the factor we are interested in – namely the presence of a PRRP in government. To 
ensure this similarity we apply coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King and Porro 2012), as it 
allows us to select cases that vary as little as possible with respect to variables other than the 
one of interest. The rationale is straightforward, as coarsened exact matching provides us with 
comparable cases within different strata from which we select the “most similar” ones.11  
We apply this method by selecting every important variable for the model of welfare 
generosity as well as for the model of economic regulation. The results indicate different 
groups for comparison which have highly similar covariates but differ in the presence of a 
PRRP in government. As it turns out, multiple comparisons might be justified by the procedure, 
however we prefer within-country over cross-country comparisons because we assume 
unobserved characteristics to be more similar in within-country analysis.12 Therefore, we 
																																								 																				
11 Alternative procedures are mainly based on regression residuals or the propensity score. However, 
different compositions of residuals allow strongly unbalanced comparisons in principle (Rohlfing 2008). 
Selections based on propensity scores avoid selection bias of the treated, but fail to balance those 
covariates which do not relate to the treatment variable (King et al. 2011). 
12 See Table D and E in the Online Appendix for the alternative comparisons following the CEM 
procedure. We could have analyzed the Balkenende I cabinet in the Netherlands or different Bundesrat 
cabinets in Switzerland. However, we decided not to choose one of them, because the Balkenende I 
cabinet had a very short duration and the cases in Switzerland have a much longer timespan than the ones 
we selected. Also, government participation in Switzerland is a problematic concept in cross-national 
comparisons because of the well-known “Zauberformel”, leading to the unique setting that here a PRRP 
is in a coalition with mainstream-left parties.   
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choose a comparison between the Klima I (no PRRP participation) and the Schuessel I (FPÖ 
participation) cabinets in Austria.  
Table 3 illustrates the distribution of the dependent and the most important independent 
variables for the two cases and shows their comparability with regard to the most important 
explanatory variables: The degree of programmatic market liberalism as well as the economic 
fundamentals hardly vary, both had exactly 33 months in government, the amount of public 
debt is almost identical, and the lagged level of unemployment is basically the same.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Qualitative Analysis: Austria 1997-2003 
Our case study analysis focuses on Austria, one of the first Western European countries where 
a PRRP participated directly in a coalition government. In 2000, decades of power-sharing 
between the SPÖ (Social Democrats) and the ÖVP (Conservatives) came to an end when the 
Conservatives decided to form an alliance with the FPÖ, led at the time by the late Jörg Haider, 
giving rise to widespread international criticism. After decades of a de facto duopoly between 
the two mainstream parties, the FPÖ presented an interesting coalition alternative for the ÖVP 
to push a liberal agenda that had been systematically blocked by the SPÖ and the unions 
(Obinger and Tálos 2006, 23). Here, we compare the grand coalition SPÖ-ÖVP headed by 
Viktor Klima that preceded the accession to power of the FPÖ with the FPÖ-ÖVP coalition 
headed by Wolfgang Schüssel. Our case comparison makes it possible to find some insights 
into the effect of PRRP participation in government. We focus on welfare reforms as measures 
of redistribution and privatisation and the regulation of public monopolies as measures of (de-
)regulation.	
 
The Klima Cabinet Reforms (1997-2000) 
In 1997, PM Viktor Klima (SPÖ) accessed the Austrian premiership as part of a grand coalition 
with the Conservative ÖVP. Klima was the Finance minister under Franz Vranitzky’s previous 
grand coalition cabinet established after the 1995 elections, and was close to Third Way ideas. 
As such, he was committed to some degree of fiscal consolidation, to a moderate departure 
from the strongly compromise-oriented type of corporatist negotiation that characterised 
policymaking (Karlhofer and Tálos 2000), and to a moderate reduction of state intervention. An 
important backdrop of economic reforms in that period was the peculiarly important role of the 
Austrian state in the economy, and the strong connections between the main political parties 
and the largest industries and banks. In 1989, the Austrian government was the biggest owner 
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of listed Austrian companies, controlling 37% of shares (blinded for review). Moreover, a large 
part of the industrial and banking sector was indirectly controlled by the main parties. For 
instance, the two largest banks the Creditanstalt and Bank Austria were closely connected to 
the Conservative ÖVP (“black”) and the Social Democrats (“red”) respectively. For many 
experts, the large size of the state-controlled sector was considered inefficient and costly. 
In many ways, economic reforms during this period were spurred by the accession of 
Austria to the European community and the implementation of the rules of the Single European 
Market. A significant movement of deregulation and opening was undertaken from the early 
1990s onwards, especially in the areas of telecommunications. Based on a law passed in 1993, 
twenty-seven privatisations were initiated (Ditz 2010, 243-4). This movement peaked in 1998, 
when privatisations proceeds generated about 12% of GDP (Belke and Schneider 2003: 18), the 
greatest share accounted for by telecom privatizations.  
In some areas, however, liberalisation during the Klima cabinet was thwarted by the 
interests of the mainstream parties. For instance, even if both mainstream parties in the 
coalition had agreed earlier on a wide-ranging programme of privatisation of the banking 
sector, the actual implementation of this programme was considerably protracted because 
parties proved very reluctant to hand out a significant part of their economic power. In 1994, an 
attempt by the Swiss bank Credit Suisse to take a participation in the Creditanstalt was 
thwarted in the middle of coalition infighting, with parties eager to keep the bank under 
Austrian control. Later on, an attempt by the “red” Bank Austria to buy the “black” 
Creditanstalt created again conflict within the coalition (Berliner Zeitung 1997), was perceived 
as a hostile takeover and severely undermined the trust between the coalition partners. Most 
importantly, this episode showed the limits of the grand coalition to pursue actual liberalisation, 
and was presented by the FPÖ and its leader Jörg Haider as a yet another proof of the 
cartelisation of Austrian politics and the grip of mainstream parties on the economy.  
In the area of welfare, the Klima cabinet set about to implement an encompassing 
reform of the pension system that would significantly reduce the contribution of the federal 
state. This reform included a change in the mode of calculation of benefits taking into account 
the whole career of workers rather than the best years only, and penalties for people retiring 
early (Schludi 2005, 75). The plan faced fierce resistance from the unions, which organised 
mass demonstrations against it (Schludi 2005, 175-6). Interestingly, even the FPÖ was 
staunchly against the plan (Schludi 2005, 169). In a context where the ruling SPÖ had strong 
ties with the labour unions, the government decided to involve them and negotiate concessions, 
but their support could not be garnered. Within the centre-right ÖVP, this led to voices 
demanding that the unions be side-lined altogether. However, the number of union-affiliated 
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MPs within the social democrats gave the unions de facto veto power, thereby blocking the 
reform and even risked a vote of no confidence in parliament. Eventually, a very substantially 
watered-down version of the reform was passed and agreed with the labour unions.  
Even if deadlock had been overcome, it became clear to the conservative ÖVP and its 
new leader Wolfgang Schüssel that substantial reforms geared towards fiscal consolidation and 
economic liberalisation would be too difficult to pass in a coalition with the SPÖ, given their 
strong ties with the unions (Luther 2010, 81). From a more party-political point of view, 
seeking an alliance with the FPÖ was also a way to counter the ascendency that the “red” bloc 
constituted by the social-democrats and unions were garnering, as shown by the takeover of the 
Creditanstalt.	
 
The Schüssel Cabinet Reforms (2000-2003) 
The 1999 Austrian federal elections yielded unexpected results: the SPÖ came first as expected 
with 33.2% of the vote, but Jörg Haider’s anti-immigration FPÖ came second (with 26.9%) by 
a few hundred votes over the ÖVP (26.9%). While the social democrats were ready to negotiate 
yet another grand coalition with the ÖVP, the latter refused and eventually agreed on a 
government programme with the FPÖ (Obinger and Tálos 2006, 9). In many ways, building a 
coalition with the FPÖ was perceived as an opportunity for the ÖVP to push through the 
retrenchment and deregulation measures which had been watered down while in government 
with the social democrats. In this context, the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition set about implementing a 
drastic programme of austerity measures that would scale back a number of social programmes 
and public spending in general (Obinger and Tálos 2010). The government was determined to 
reduce public spending to a greater extent and at a quicker pace than any of its predecessors 
(Ditz 2010, 245). The FPÖ received important portfolios in this area, notably Finance and 
Social Affairs (Luther 2010, 88; Ennser-Jedenastik 2016: 415). 
While the pension reform of the previous government had been substantially watered 
down by the power of unions, the Schüssel government opted for side-lining them in the 
decision-making process, thereby breaking with a longstanding tradition of corporatist 
agreement in Austrian policymaking. The FPÖ did not oppose this strategy as it was in line 
with its longstanding hostility to union power. In this context, a major pension reform provided 
for an increase in the retirement age, cuts to benefits for people retiring early, a higher 
retirement age for public servants and a reform of widows’ pensions. This reform was similar 
to the one passed in 1997, but its fiscal retrenchment component was to be achieved within a 
space of three years whereas the watered-down reform of 1997 was supposed to achieve the 
same within 30 years (Schludi 2005, 180). Over the two cabinets led the ÖVP with FPÖ 
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support, public spending as a share of GDP decreased from 51.4 per cent in 2000 to 48.2 per 
cent in 2007 (Ditz 2010, 248). 
The FPÖ had initially signed up to the retrenchment agenda of the ÖVP but afterwards 
significantly tempered its impetus for welfare retrenchment when it realised it severely hurt its 
own electorate (Heinisch 2003). Before accessing power, the party had combined a form of 
“welfare populism” advocating fiscal retrenchment at the expense of self-serving public 
servants and politicians on the one hand, combined with a staunch defence of acquired rights 
and promises of increased spending targeted at its working-class clientele on the other. Hence, 
the party had always opposed retrenchment for existing pensions, and defended benefits for 
“deserving” recipients such as the sick, disabled, elderly, and mothers (Ennser-Jedenastik 2016: 
418). The party had also been keen on public spending if it served electoral purposes, as the 
record of Jörg Haider in government in the Land of Carinthia demonstrated. One of his flagship 
measures had been for instance the “Kinderscheck” a monthly payment paid to mothers for 
each child, making the region the most generous for family allowances in Austria. He also 
initiated a “mother’s pension” allocating 150 euros extra for “deserving” mothers above 60, 
heavily subsidised gas and other benefits targeted at pensioners in particular, often handed out 
in cash in front of TV cameras (Profil 2009).  
In 2002, early elections were held after the resignation of several FPÖ ministers and the 
collapse of the coalition. The FPÖ was severely damaged, losing 34 seats and two thirds of its 
votes, and joined another coalition with the ÖVP on a much weaker basis. In 2003, after this 
major electoral defeat, the FPÖ sought to temper the move by the ÖVP to reform the pension 
system. While it had agreed on the broad agenda of a major pension reform, internal opposition 
within the party led the sitting social affairs Minister to ask for a referendum on the issue 
(Schludi 2005, 187). After the reform was eventually agreed in cabinet, on the next day eight of 
the FPÖ’s eighteen MPs declared they would not support the bill in the plenary vote unless 
there were further measures to alleviate changes (Luther 2010, 96). The party was also able to 
introduce a few compensation measures targeted at its own clientele. One of them was the so-
called “Hacklerregelung”, which allowed older workers in specific physically demanding 
professions - one of its core clienteles – to retire early (Ennser-Edenastik 2016: 420). In this 
context, the party clearly sought to act as a retrenchment brake to preserve its electoral 
prospects. 
In the areas of privatisation and liberalisation, where the direct costs to voters were less 
clear, the government pursued reforms in a fairly unrestricted manner. For instance, measures 
of financial liberalisation passed under the Schüssel cabinet allowed for a five-fold increase in 
the market capitalisation of the Vienna stock exchange (Ditz 2010, 254). For the first time, the 
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cabinet planned the total handover of ownership of a number of former state monopolies to the 
private sector. With a new law, they transformed the state holding agency tasked with 
managing state participation in industrial sectors (ÖIAG - Österreichischen Industrieholding 
Aktiengesellschaft) into a privatisation agency.  The state totally rescinded its participation in 
airports, the tobacco industry, banks and other industrial sectors, and reduced its participation 
in Telekom Austria and the Austrian Post (Kepplinger 2009: 1-2). In 2001 alone, privatisation 
proceeds reached 925 mio Euros. This partly continued the movement started in the 1990s, but 
also accelerated in a number of domains, for instance in railways, which yielded significant 
resistance from unions (Ditz 2010, 245).  
For both the ÖVP and the FPÖ, privatisation was much less controversial than welfare 
reform because it involved lower electoral costs and even concrete strategic benefits for both 
parties. For the ÖVP, privatization was a way to weaken trade unions and social democrats, 
whose power base laid in the state monopolies. For the FPÖ, privatization was a way to 
dismantle the political cartel that controlled large parts of the Austrian political economy, to 
which they had never belonged, and perhaps place some of their officials in bureaucratic 
positions of influence. This strategy became explicit when the coalition adopted a new rule in 
2001 to bar the representation of organization with collective bargaining rights in the board of 
the Association of Social Security Providers, an organisation hitherto governed according to the 
principle of self-government. This new rule was notably used to deny the chair of the Union of 
Railway Employees a seat on the governing board of the institution. This decision was later 
overturned by the Constitutional court. In the area of deregulation, the electoral trade-offs faced 
by the Radical Right in the area of welfare were less present, and the interests of the PRRP and 
the mainstream right were more aligned. 
  
Discussion and Conclusion 
While previous studies of the policy impact of PRRPs have focused almost exclusively on 
cultural issues, the impact of these on socio-economic policy formulation has so far largely 
been ignored by researchers and commentators. Our mixed methods comparative study of the 
impact of PRRPs on redistributive and (de-)regulative economic policies takes a first step 
towards filling the gap and unpacking the logic that shapes socio-economic policy-making in 
cabinets with and without PRRPs. 
Starting with the finding that so far Western European PRRPs have only been able to 
form coalitions with market-liberal mainstream parties, our results indicate that governments 
with PRRP participation show less political will to retrench welfare benefits compared with 
other centre-right governments. In contrast, coalitions with PRRP participation show 
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significantly more political will to deregulate – and especially to privatize – the economy, even 
if these efforts are not as pronounced as these of market-liberal governments without PRRP 
participation. Both with regard to redistributive and deregulative policies, differences between 
PRRP and non-PRRP governments become more visible for long-term governments with 
sufficient time to implement such reforms.   
Based on our mixed methods design, we see two interrelated arguments for why 
PRRPs do allow for greater deregulation but not for greater welfare state retrenchment when 
participating in government. First, the working-class constituency of PRRPs makes it difficult 
for these parties to openly support welfare retrenchment, especially when it comes to traditional 
social insurance schemes benefitting their electoral clienteles, such as pensions. Secondly, 
restrained by their voters’ interests, PRRPs do offer their centre-right coalition parties 
concessions with regard to deregulation. In the following, we would like to point to the 
theoretical implications of these findings for further research and also discuss how they are 
supported or contradicted by the quantitative and the qualitative parts of our mixed-methods 
design.   
Starting with welfare generosity, our quantitative analysis broadly supports the 
theoretical expectation that PRRPs will have difficulties in following a program of 
retrenchment because of their rather left-leaning voter bases. The qualitative case study on 
Austria made it possible to nuance this view, as the FPÖ indeed supported the welfare 
retrenchment effort of the ÖVP, until it realised that it was damaging electorally and afterwards 
sought to temper the retrenchment impetus of its coalition partner. We see this as a telling 
example that the immigration-focused Radical Right might not be aware of the electoral 
consequences of their socio-economic agenda – a situation that might be especially relevant for 
PRRPs with no former governmental experience.  
With regard to deregulation, the political agendas of centre right and PRRPs find 
common ground, in particular where traditional structures of market regulation are dominated 
by labour unions. Privatization of state owned companies and deregulation of labour markets 
not only constitute liberalization efforts per se, but also erode the power base of PRRP 
competitors such as left-wing parties. This strategy is emphasised by Jensen (2014) when he 
talks about the “erode and attack” strategy pursued by right-wing governments to undermine 
their left competitors. In our study, the quantitative influence is shown by the positive effects of 
PRRPs in government on labour market deregulation and privatization. It is complemented by 
the case studies demonstrating similar results on another level of causality. In Austria, the 
Radical Right also supported privatisation efforts which could undermine the power base of 
trade unions and social democrats.  
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In the long run, changing the actors that implement policies might have an even greater 
impact than directly changing the policies. Future research should therefore pay much more 
attention to these procedural changes. The arena of industrial relations seems especially 
promising for such analyses, as changes here might also feed back into redistributive issues. 
Also, focussing on the role of salience for the policy reform agenda of PRRPs could be a 
valuable avenue for research. In line with Culpepper (2010), it seems easier to liberalize in 
domains that are not very salient or technical (such as economic regulation) than in ones that 
are highly politicized (such as welfare issues) and our analysis is very much in line with this 
general statement. While such differences are surely relevant for all parties and are well 
documented in research on welfare state retrenchment (Pierson 1996), salience might play an 
extraordinary role for the strategies of PRRPs, because it makes it more difficult to “blur” their 
economic position (blinded for review).  
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Table 1: PRRPs in government from 1970 to 2010 
 
Country PRRP Government Participation (formal or informal) Duration 
Austria Freedom Party (since 1986 PRRP) 
Formal: 04.02.2000-24.11.2002 (Schüssel I), 
24.11.2002-28.02.2003 (Schüssel II), 




 Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZö) Formal: 05.04.2005-11.01.2007 (Schüssel IV) 0 
Denmark Danish People’s Party 
Informal: 27.11.2001-18.02.2005 (Rasmussen F I), 
18.02.2005-23.11.2007 (Rasmussen F II), 
23.11.2007-05.04.2009 (Rasmussen F III), 





Italy Northern League 
Formal: 11.05.1994-17.01.1995 (Berlusconi I), 
11.06.2001-28.05.2005 (Berlusconi II), 
28.05.2005-17.05.2006 (Berlusconi III), 





 National Alliance 
Formal: 11.05.1994-17.01.1995 (Berlusconi I), 
11.06.2001-28.05.2005 (Berlusconi II), 




Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn Formal: 21.07.2002-27.05.2003 (Balkenende I) 0 
Norway Progress Party 
Informal: 08.09.1985-09.05.1986 (Willoch III), 
16.10.1989-03.11.1990 (Syse), 




Sweden New Democracy Informal: 03.10.1991-06.10.1994 (Bildt) 1 
Switzerland Swiss People’s Party (since 1999 PRRP) 
Formal: 15.12.1999-10.12.2003 (Bundesrat 1999), 
10.12.2003-12.12.2007 (Bundesrat 2003), 





Notes: Table 1 reports only PRRPs that have attained informal or formal representation at national government level prior to 
2010. While most of these cases have also been included in previous studies on the policy impact of PRRPs (De Lange 2012; 
Rovny 2013), the Syse (Norway) and Bildt (Sweden) governments might call for further explanation, as there were no official 
coalition agreements between the PRRPs and the government parties. Concerning Syse, Narud (1995: 10-11) explains that the 
centre-right coalition parties were “dependent on the support of the Progress Party” and that the good experiences with this 
support paved the way for the Progress Party’s inclusion in later governments. With regard to Sweden, the Bildt government 
“was dependent on the New Democracy’s support to pass its legislation” making this party also a “veto player” for the reform 
of social policy (Anderson and Immergut 2007, 370). Government duration is coded categorically: 0 if the government lasted 









































Hypothesis involved H1 H1 H2 H2 
PRRP gov. support 0.59*** -0.52* 0.65 1.88* 
PRRP* Gov. duration - 1.09*** - -1.42 
Market liberalism of government 









Gov. duration (in months) -2.21** -0.77 13.91***  -1.42 
Gov. seat share -1.28* -1.18* -7.52***  -7.39*** 
l. union density -1.34*** -1.85*** -8.82***  -8.02*** 
Δ unemployment -0.60 -0.95 29.82***  32.60*** 
l. unemployment -0.71 -0.03 6.40**  2.88 
De-industrialization -1.20 -2.07** 3.32  3.97 
l. debt 0.00 -0.00 -0.03* -0.01 
Δ debt 0.71 0.59 -9.02*** -8.41** 
Δ GDP 0.08 0.66 28.91***  33.11*** 
Ln GDP -2.77* -4.46*** 3.98 5.42 
Δ pop >65 -0.19 -0.49 -6.22**  -7.69*** 
Δ pop <15 -1.93 -1.23 6.56  5.60 
l. Level Welfare Generosity (Model 1-2) -0.03 -0.03 - - 
l. Level Social Spending (2a-2b) - - - - 
l. Level Deregulation (3-4) - - -9.86***  -8.55*** 
Migration rate 1.10 -0.28 -3.24  -0.28 
l. Globalization 3.25** 2.88** -16.01***  -17.29*** 
Δ Globalization -1.65 -2.82** -12.69*** -12.03*** 
EMU-Integration -0.24 0.34 3.68*** 3.30*** 
Cons. 6.75*** 10.39*** -12.53** -15.30** 
R² 0.29 0.39 0.73 0.71 
Number of countries 16 16 17 17 
Time frame  1970-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 
n 200 203 237 237 
 Positive cases 19 19 19 19 
Robustness (Online Appendix) Figure B  Figure B Figure C,D Figure C,D 
Notes: * < 0.90; **<0.95; ***<0.99 levels of confidence. All coefficients are standardized by beta weights and 

































Government duration (0 = short, 1 = medium, 2 = long)
PRRP support Market liberal governments
AME with 90% CIs on Generosity
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Figure 2: Average marginal effects (AME) on deregulation conditional on government duration 
	
 
Table 3: Characteristics of the Selected Cases 
      Dependent Variables 
  



















































































































             
1997-1999 Austria Klima I -2.20 0.82 5.10 0.62 4.03 0.20 3.24 91.84 33 68,11 
2000-2002 Austria Schuessel I 2.00 0.82 9.02 0.66 4.00 -0.33 2.02 83.81 33 67,54 
 






















Government duration (0 = short, 1 = medium, 2 = long)
PRRP support Market liberal governments
AME 90% CIs on Deregulation
